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JEMAND VON NIEMAND, DEATH-CAMP DOCTOR:
 
EVIL AS STRUCTURING PRINCIPLE IN THE LATER
 FICTION 
OF
 WILLIAM STYRON
Terry White
Kent State University (Ashtabula 
Campus)
When Styron’s death-camp doctor confronts Sophie with her
 
terrible choice in the final pages of the novel, nearly all of the book’s
 quarter of a million words have been spent in preparing the reader for
 this last bit
 
of narrative unraveling so that  we see, through the eyes of  
young Stingo, what the source of Sophie’s anguish has been
 throughout the summer of his dangerous acquaintance with
 
her and  her
lover,
 
Nathan Landau.1 As Sophie agonizes  at the instant of her arrival  
in Auschwitz, forced to choose one child to save by this inebriated,
 tortured intellectual at the selection ramp, she blurts out which of
 
her  
two children’s murdering she is forced to participate in: ‘“Take the
 baby!’ she called out ‘Take my little girl!”’ (p. 484). And so Emmi is
 led off to the crematorium at Birkenau; Jan (her boy, whom she will
 never see again) is removed to the children’s camp. Unsurpassed in
 Styron’s fiction for the sheer portrayal of a character’s physical and
 emotional suffering, Sophie’s Choice exemplifies techniques of
 narration that Styron has been using since Lie Down in Darkness
 (1951) which, like his signature theme of ineradicable and ancient
 human 
evil,
 breathes  life into an  allegorical framework.
The enigmatic appearance of Dr.
 
Jemand von Niemand in Chapter  
13 may seem anticlimactic and externally imposed by the mature
 Stingo; he narrates from that temporally distant point from which
 amiable,
 
old-fashioned narrators emerge to address readers with  a kind of  
chatty and engaging familiarity of nineteenth-century narrators as
 concerned about a character’s motivation as they presumed their readers
 to be—a
 
universal  condition  of the serialized novel. Informal asides to  
the reader characterize this narrator’s performance as
 
far back as  Chapter
9, when the epiphanal mentality of twenty-two-year-old Stingo 
is
 set  
aside for the enlightened, backward-glancing man who lived to fulfill
 the promise he made from the Coney Island beach where he lay
 obsessed through the night by Sophie’s erratic life from Warsaw to the
 Bronx. He delivers his promise to tell Sophie’s story in the historical
 context of Auschwitz and the Holocaust just as the real author had
 fulfilled a promise to tell the story of Nat Turner’s rebellion from his
 boyhood in the Virginia Tidewater region.
Styron’s preference for psychopaths, human-monsters, and
 
metamorphosing devils may seem merely another shopworn variation
1
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on the freaks of Faulkner, O’Connor, and McCullers. They make
 
excellent moral agents, 
as
 at  least one  critic has noted.2 Sophie’s grief  
and suffering are compelling—even independently of Auschwitz’s
 horrors—but she
 
cannot express more than her own sorrow, in her turn 
as a narrating persona of Stingo’s (he subsumes himself, psychically
 and ideologically—and idiomatically into her being). The great
 historical tragedy of the death-camps looms large
 
and  controversial, as  
did the volatile times of racial conflict of the sixties when The
 Confessions of Nat Turner (1967) found a hostile reception among
 some black readers who resented the appropriation of a black man’s
 being.3 The creator of Sophie, although she is not Jewish, effected
 similar antagonism as a result of his appropriation of Auschwitz’s
 enormous human tragedy for the purposes of
 
fiction, and as he did to  
critics of Nat Turner then, he asserts (this
 
time, in the opening pages of  
Chapter 9 itself) the primacy of art by rebutting the
 
convictions of Elie  
Wiesel and George Steiner that novelists “cheapen” the Holocaust by
 using it, and that it 
is
 the “possession alone of those who suffered and  
died, or survived it” (p. 218).
What makes Jemand von Niemand interesting to us is neither the
 
postponement of his entry into the narrative threading but his
placement: he is tethered to the novel’s events and existents with the
 frailest of threads—an exquisite choice of Styron’s own in balancing
 multiple
 
narrators—so that  the reader is brought into collusion with the  
creating persona of the mature Stingo’s last narrative moments in
 facing us with a character who: 1) does not
 
exist  (in the framework  of  
the storyworld); 2) is a shared property of the narrating performances
 
of  
Sophie (who told Stingo about a “real” death-camp doctor), young
 Stingo (who “forgot” details
 
of this part  of Sophie’s narration), and the  
mature Stingo, the accomplished, discursive voice of
 
Chapter 9, who  
greets us with a modest and self-effacing
 
polemic about the Holocaust  
authors
 
and presumptive novelists.
To Styron appraisers in the career-author mode, a divided house
 surely, this is a glove thrown in the general direction of his harshest
 critics. How often he has heard that his novels sprawl out of control,
 that he cannot handle point of view, or that he is prolix even for a
 transplanted Gothic Southern regionalist
 
no one can say. Nonetheless,  
I am convinced that the creation of Jemand von Niemand is a further
 reason that we ought to borrow a suggestion from Wayne Booth’s The
 Company We Keep (1988) and consider a sensible approach to career
­author criticism for authors whose vision maintains a fixed course
 despite the deconstructionists limping behind them and snapping at
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their heels.4 (Career-author criticism presumes inherent values and
 
avows a non serviam to the followers of Paul de Man.) Styron’s
 artifice of the doctor’s creation is anachronistic but not maladroit.
 Thackeray and Trollope pulled similar strings of
 
their puppets and as  
often
 
as not declaimed to readers about the hypothetical  motives; in  this  
sense we may look at Henry James’s penchant for examining mere
 slivers of gesture, nuance, and feeling at great length while the action
 stops—and, as we all know, James is not above an occasional “dear
 reader”
 
aside himself.
Styron is, in effect, looking back technically—beyond the
 nineteenth-century parlor tricks, however—to the well-trod path of
 allegory itself in his own
 
painstaking consideration of  the relationship  
between his art, his characters, and their relationship to the greatest
 collapse of moral values in our century. It is allegory, ultimately, that
 exists at the bottom of a vortex of cycles that makes Jemand von
 Niemand’s place and presence clear in the unfolding narrative’s
 deployment by several hands
 
and at several removes in time.
Consider, for instance, the small portion of Sophie’s narrating
 duties where the narrative
 
voice and point of view  coincide; her story is  
“recast” by Stingo for us in terms
 
of the idiosyncrasies and phraseology  
of Sophie, ostensibly from two vantage points in the storyworld: the
 hotel room in Washington
 
where she and he have fled Nathan Landau in  
his murderous rage and that other temporal remove in the indefinite
 future from 
which
 all narratives proceed.
Doctor Jemand von Niemand [Somebody from Nobody] is an
 historical composite of types from the infamous Doctors’ Trials after
 Nuremberg. The most vicious of
 
all, untried and unindicted until the  
1960’s (in absentia by
 
a West German court),  had been Josef Mengele,  
physician in charge of
 
the female barracks at Auschwitz, who died in  
Brazil in 1977. Styron’s doctor shares the real vices of certain camp
 doctors, such as Werner Rhöde and Hans König, who
 
would  frequently  
show up intoxicated for duty at the selection ramp.5 Although only
 one doctor of
 
all those serving Himmler’s 4-point genocidal program  
known 
as
 Die Endlösung paid with his life (one committed suicide  
before execution), many, like the prominent Baron von Verschuer,
 resumed their professional and academic lives after the war; von
 Verschuer, for instance, had guided Mengele’s career from his position
 as director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute of Berlin and was one of
 Europe’s leading geneticists and an ardent spokesman of the Third
 Reich’s “unworthy life” precept that exerted a profound spell upon
 Mengele during his student years in philosophy and medicine at
 
Frankf
urt.
3
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Of course, Sophie’s doctor is also symbolically
 
linked to the lover  
Nathan
 
Landau through  a madness  exacerbated by the  atrocities against  
the
 
Jewish people. Sophie, as survivor, is tormented by her memories  
of Auschwitz and
 
by Nathan, who preys upon her guilt. The mythical  
golem of Jewish folklore, a Frankenstein monster, 
is
 the narrator’s  
symbol binding all these transformations from the human—Nathan
 transmogrifies from sane, protective lover of Sophie to her raging
 tormentor; Sophie herself
 
from beautiful woman to crone; and Stingo  
from aspiring novelist to, briefly, Jew-hating
 
racist. Even so, the most  
dramatic transformation occurs
 
when Sophie confronts  the morbid camp  
doctor reeling in his boots at the selection ramp; his twisted values
 seem a gratuitous evil and inverse rationality—yet her choice (no
 choice, of course) 
is 
as  fatalistic and hopeless as the choice of medieval  
man in an allegory confronting the devil with cloven hoof
 
and horns.  
The symbolic destruction of innocence, eight-year-old Eva Maria
 Zawistowska holding
 
her flute as she is led away “into the legion of the  
damned” (p. 484), is the novel’s great symbol of
 
evil’s wake. Sophie  
tells Stingo: “She still
 
had her mís—and  her flute,” and at that juncture  
Sophie’s and Stingo’s escape 
from
 the demented Nathan ceases, and we  
are introduced to
 
Dr. Niemand  (p. 484).
This confrontation exists in Sophie’s memory as the last of the
 Dantean circles of hell she has experienced, but its special place in the
 narrator’s re-creation is a result of the mature Stingo authoring and
 bringing to
 
fruition the  novels the  young Stingo aspired to write during  
his wild summer with Sophie
 
and Nathan. By means of this  repetition  
of character—Stingo narrating and acting within his story’s Bronx
 temporal zone—and by doubling his characters and themes of
 opposition, such 
as
 Sophie at Auschwitz/Sophie in America; the racist  
South of the present/the Jew-hating Poland of Nazi occupation, Styron
 makes comprehensible these bisecting planes of time and history. 
As repetition of character and event between times and narrators
 
intensifies,  
we
 
get the cyclical sense of “movement” that Styron  has contrived; it is  
perhaps faintly reminiscent of Yeats’ intersecting cones or “gyres” 
(his falconry term in A Vision for the swooping effect of the falcon
 descending in cycles of greater velocity
 
to strike its  prey).
For example, Rudolf Höss’ memoirs, freely incorporated
 throughout earlier chapters, anticipate the structuring principle Styron
 borrows from Holocaust writers like Arendt and Steiner and puts to
 
use  
in Chapter 9 for dramatic effect. At that point, the fictive
 autobiographical author has introduced
 
himself, like his good Victorian  
predecessors, at a point in the
 
narration of events where Sophie is thrust  
headlong into the death-camp horrors of Auschwitz after a brief
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summary of her interlude in Warsaw. The intermittent narrating
 
performances of Stingo alternate with Sophie’s by means of the
 transforming powers of the ultimate narrator who adopts the
 phraseology
 
and psychology of Sophie herself. The  chain of narration  
is never
 
doubtful, and  the full authorial vision of the  book  bears down  
on the reader in that highly mannered surface eloquence that
 characterizes all Styron’s novels. Is it not Percy Lubbock’s axiom that
 the finer mind of the author must look over his character’s shoulder,
 sometimes borrow his eyes for greater effects 
than
 would be possible  if  
we were
 
confined to the limited conceptual powers of a character in a  
storyworld? Clearly, Styron wants to graft a theatre-of-the-absurd
 atmosphere onto Sophie’s final narration because of its all-consuming
 importance to the book’s theme. Those critics who cry prolixity to
 Styron are, I believe, oblivious to the superb alternation of characters,
 points of view, and narrating voice within chapters that mark the
 relentless progress of cycles toward this final descent into the inferno of
 Auschwitz.
Sophie’s
 
life-in-death at the camp is, she reveals, almost privileged  
compared to hundreds of
 
thousands of Slavs, Jews, and Gypsies who  
worked 
as
 slave labor for several major German companies. There is  
historical precept for the mundane absurdity of Auschwitz. Höss, as
 Auschwitz Kommandant, fondly records swimming
 
with his  children in  
the nearby Sola River. Mengele’s wife Irene, visiting shortly before
 the
 
camp was closed in 1944 due to the proximity of the Soviet army,  
writes about
 
that  everpresent  “sweet stench” that pervades the grounds  
and about picking blackberries (p. 59).
Evil’s banality is the externally imposed theme, one the mature
 
Stingo discourses upon at
 
the outset of Chap. 9—but  it is also a career-  
long theme of Styron, one he has developed and featured in multiple
 ways
 
and forms, such as the familial evil of Lie Down in Darkness, the  
institutionalized evil of the short
 
novel The Long  March (1953) and in  
its most
 
insidious form before The Confessions of Nat Turner (Marine  
Corps, slavery); the societal evil of
 
Set This House on Fire (1960) is,  
in sheer narrative eloquence and ambition, his most articulate
 expression of pure human evil, but it failed to impress critics awaiting
 yet another tribute to the Gothic Regionalist niche he had carved for
 himself in his first book. The many instances of characters evolving
 into their opposites or into dream-figures is his application of the
 vortex principle in his fiction. SC makes a rational sense out of this
 most irrational warping of the civilized instincts of humankind. The
 institutionalized
 
evil of slavery in Nat  Turner’s epoch  was a  mere half ­
step from its most malignant
 
form in Sophie’s Auschwitz.
5
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Styron’s structuring principle of the vortex 
was
 first noted as a  
Southern Gothic phenomenon
 
by J. Douglas Perry,  who  describes  these
interlocking cycles of repetition of character and event as being
 common to the works of Faulkner, Capote, and Styron.6 In technique
 Styron has varied little since LDD, which book exposes the hollow
 core of the genteel
 
Loftises of Port Warwick, Virginia. Critics largely  
ignored the technical virtuosity of mental switchovers into and out of
 virtually every major and minor character—the Faulknerian echo swept
 all before it, especially Peyton Loftis’s suicidally poetic stream-of-
 conscious soliloquy (pp. 335-86). This overwrought, Joycean display
 mixes interior monologue, narrated monologue (a valuable term first
 proposed by Dorrit Cohn in 19667), and
 
covert narration. No critic, to  
my knowledge,
 
examined the use of, or deemed  significant, the second- 
person segments that frame the story’s setting
 
by taking the reader  into  
Port Warwick on a commuter train
 
from the North—the very  train,  one  
assumes, which takes the reader North at night, the detritus of the
 Loftises’ misery swept away in the jubilation from the riverbank’s
 baptismal ceremony
 
(pp.  9-11; 399-400).
Such framework acknowledges
 
Faulkner’s influence, of course; its 
lushness 
is
 exactly what turns Nathan Landau into the savage critic of  
Stingo’s apprenticeship efforts to describe the death of a young beauty
 from his boyhood days in Newport, Virginia. There are numerous
 transitions that shift point of view between temporal distances as well
 as characters’ psyches—for example, Loftis occasionally communes
 with the disembodied voice of his father from the hearse; sometimes
 point of view’s literal perceptual powers expands or contracts
 independently
 
of characters to whom we  might attribute it Such  rapid,  
precise
 
transitions, once admired in the young  Styron, became a weapon  
against him in
 
the later books.
It may be true that we use fewer pronominal markers in critiquing
 since Wayne Booth’s rebuke in The Rhetoric of Fiction to critics
 enamored of structuralism, wafting overseas from France by the early
 1960’s.8 Critical readers continue to depend on them, even if one’
s approach to literature may assume
 
polemical or exclusively theoretical  
directions. Take, for instance, Styron’s short novel about a forced
 march at a Marine Corps base in the South. He uses a technique to
 enable distance, one familiar in his later fiction: a Jamesian reflector
 observes and records impressions of conflicts between characters who
 embody the evil within that focal character but who are themselves
 dynamic
 opposites.
6
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The Long
 
March, virtually ignored  on appearance in the first issue  
of discovery, also drew charges
 
of prolixity and mishandling  of point of  
view from backward-glancing critics after the appearance of Set This
 House on Fire, the long-awaited book after LDD? When Styron
 incorporates autobiographical and confessional techniques, as
 
he does in  
Nat Turner and SC, he resorts to a problematic form of narration that
 Wendy Lesser argues we Americans have special difficulty with: the
 autobiography itself.
She claims in “Autobiography and the ‘I’ of the Beholder” that
 
non-Europeans have great difficulty “spitting out that autobiographical
 sign of self’:
[T]he possibility of exchanging positions with the reader
 
comes about by means of, and as a way of demonstrating, a
 strong sense of self-possession. You can be I and I can be
 you because each of us possesses that ‘acute consciousness’
 of our individuality [quoting Leonard Woolf, in Vol 5 of his autobiography].10 (26)
Many early critics, for example, alluded
 
to the point of view in this  
short novel as being “split,” “omniscient third-person,” and “first-
 person.” The Long March, however, is a combination of interior
 monologue and first-person that is typical of those third-person
 narrations that
 
use the  best of both to  keep a narrative fabric seamless.  
Cohn’s term, narrated monologue, has been ignored for two generations
 despite its
 
invaluable discussion of techniques  common after Joyce  from  
Lawrence through Styron to the new fictioneers like Pynchon and
 Boyle.
Autobiography and mixtures of
 
narration unaccompanied by tag  
labels of
 
“thinking,” “believing,” “feeling,” etc., are numerous in  LM  
but frequently absent from Set This House onward. Marc Ramer’s
 incisive discussion of the rebel-hero motif in LM and STHF
 is
 based on  
themes, not structural principles of narration. But one is not
 conventionally detachable from the other.11 
Col.
 Templeton’s form of  
“institutionalized evil
“
 in LM is a confrontation between himself and  
the rebel-hero Capt. Mannix, who momentarily becomes the very
 monster he loathes in Col. Templeton. Styron had long since learned
 from
 
Nietzsche’s Also Sprach Zarathustra: “Wer mit  Ungeheur kampf,  
mag zusehn, dass er nicht dabei aum Ungeheur wird” [We who fight
 monsters must beware of becoming monsters ourselves]. Each of
 Styron’s novels presents a variation of
 
a making of an evil somebody  
from Nobody.
7
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There has never been an effort by Styron’s detractors to remove
 
accusations of “sprawling” and “looseness of narrative form” that fixed
 itself to his work from this point onward; instead vituperation
 characterizes many critical commentators after STHF.
Again, traditional terminology suffices—and doesn’t. Lt. Culver’s
 
role in the preceding work is like that of Peter Leverett in STHF. And
 the evil is similar: rather than the microcosm of the Marine Corps,
 there is the macrocosm of American society itself—fat with post-War
 wealth, money-mad, and arrogantly confident of itself. Like Col.
 Templeton before
 
him, Mason  Flagg is a kind of hierarchical symbol  of  
evil personified. His monstrosity is not undercut by the kind of
 caricature self-evident in Peter’s naming [Leveret = rabbit]. But Mason
 Flagg, Hollywood scion and benefactor of both Leverett and the rebel
 figure Cass Kinsolving, 
is
 seen  from two distinct planes of time and  
space.
By alternating narrators—Peter at the front of the story and Cass
 
(Flagg’s victim and murderer) in the second half—we have one more
 variation on the classical whodunit formula of crime detection:
 reconstructing a crime from the present moment of narration into the
 past. Styron’s strategy is based on complementary narrating
 performances (Cass’s is subsumed by Peter, the ultimate narrator), and
 Leverett, being the well-spoken narrator that he is, does what all
 narrators do: he tells us some things and holds back much for
 suspense. The recombination of
 
narrators is simpler here than in SC  
because it
 
is seemingly put together by Peter two years after the events  
in Sambuco, Italy.
One critic, an early detractor of Styron, will serve to illustrate the
 
sort of criticism that depends upon the anomaly of traditional point-of-
 view terminology. Norman Kelvin assesses Styron’s fiction from LDD
 to Nat Turner, and
 
he finds Styron seriously wanting in artistic control;  
specifically, he says Styron is grossly unable to control point of
 
view  
with consistency. It is all flawed, either “spurious” or “sentimental”
 because Styron fails the test of “calculated discontinuity” that would
 otherwise mark his fictional technique as “modernist” (p. 209).12
 Kelvin’s reductive generalizations are not based on criticisms of the
 novels as 
they
 are on the kinds of  hasty generalizations plucked from  
point-of-view terminology that has been passed down from James,
 Lubbock, and several Anglo-American critics after Forster’s Aspects of
 the Novel (1927). There 
is
 no truism so commonplace as that which  
says that 
any
 failure at so strategic a level as point of view must bring  
down tone, setting, characterization, and
 
so forth in a heap.
Kelvin demolishes LM
 
in particular:
8
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Had Styron kept the focus on Mannix’s struggle with the
 
concept of Templeton, he might have seen that by giving
 his story the structure of a game, he had conquered evil:
 that he had internalized it within the mind and feelings of
 his main character, 
(p.
 216)
Kelvin understands that Styron has made the “meaning and action
 
of
 
evil” his special theme, and furthermore that separating evil from a  
character may cause that evil to appear extrinsic to the story, which
 seems to
 
be what he means when he refers to “a motive for action in an  
internalized struggle” (p. 216). However, Mannix is not the “main”
 character in his sense: Culver is and Culver’s conceptualizing
 (internalizing via his phrasing, psychology, and ideology) of Mannix’s
 struggle, and his own struggle with Martnix and the Marine Corps, is
 the “game” Styron is playing—and playing fair within the limitations
 and privileges of the viewpoints adopted for conveying the game.
 Narrated monologue, obviously, would serve us well because of the
 clutter accumulated by first- and third-person points of 
view.
 One may  
question whether the triangular relationship of Culver, Mannix, and
 Templeton is, in fact, restored to a point of equilibrium at the end of
 the story, but one should not refer to banalities about point of view to
 do it.
Kelvin is one of the few critics of Nat Turner who render a strong
 
critical judgment of the novel without recourse to sociological
 observations on race-hatred in America. Yet he concludes that Styron
 falls short: “For once again in Styron’s work, the unmet requirement
 of form has interfered with meaning, and it is form that suggests the
 needs of both” (p. 204).
Form is only good, Kelvin implies, when themes are internalized
 
within a main character’s psyche and bad 
when
 it results from what he  
calls “diversio ary effect,” referring to Styron’s divided
 
characters who  
must confront evil with their own fragmented personalities; these
 novels are all 
“
missed  opportunities”  because evil is not shown to be “a  
condition of life” [Styron’s Afterword to LM] or “a determinant of
 social forms and conduct” but is instead (in LM specifically) “an
 imprint on the imagination that can be divorced
 
from its external cause  
and made a motive
 
for action in an  internalized  struggle” (p. 216).
But Styron, it seems to me, has done precisely what Kelvin,
 among others, accuses him of failing to do: the internalized struggles
 of Milton Loftis (LDD), Culver (LM), Peter Leverett (STHF) all occur
 with their opposite figures as a result of internalized and covertly
 
9
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mediated narrative transactions that require repetition and movement
 
from past to
 
present. These focal characters cannot be subsumed under  
traditional rubrics, such as “split” point of
 
view, third-person selective  
omniscience and so forth. Contrary to axioms about point of view in
 our literature anthologies about narrators who are not identifiable
 personae within the story (that is, “objective”) and third-person stories
 themselves being “outside” the story, we must
 
revise our notions about  
disembodied narrative voices when we clearly have characters’ literal and
 perceptual points of view borrowed or attributable within contexts of
 sheer inertia. Clearly, if ambiguity of point of view at moments occurs
 coincidentally with acts of narrating and reflecting from temporally
 removed vantage points, we are not in the presence of heavy-handed
 authorial intrusions in every case. (Booth expresses dismay in The
 Company We Keep at Ursula’s sudden fit of Weltschmerz in Women in
 Love; it is too out of character for her, he says, and reminds us that
 “point of view” is “an axis of responsibility,” and any blurring that
 results from its failure, as Kelvin clearly sees in Styron’s case, makes it
 “an ethical,” not a mere “technical
 
invention.”13
In fact, Sophie's Choice exploits every previous form of narration
 Styron had 
used:
 young Stingo experiences the Holocaust vicariously  
through his retrospective of Sophie “that long ago summer,” using her
 idiom, eyes, memory, and psychology; the “mature” author, who wrote
 the books young Stingo dreamed
 
of writing, addresses his readers from  
that NOW—a spatio-temporal point cotemporal with the act of
 reading—the amiable and courteous nineteenth-century author steps
 forth to reflect
 
upon his characters, the meaning of Auschwitz, his own  
fabrications.
When, for instance, the narrator brings us to the point of Sophie’s
 
choice itself, which of her two children to 
save,
 we have a layering of  
narrative voices, plausible explanations of how the narrating character
 happened to get us there—all based on the two simplest dicta
 
of what  a  
narrator is: the knower of the story and the withholder of information.
 For
 
the camp doctor who forces the choice as Sophie steps off the train  
with her children is Jemand Von Niemand, a symbolic golem of all the
 ineradicable evil and race-hatred in the novel. Dr. Niemand is at the
 bottom of this foul vortex where history and fiction, truth and artifice
 must collide. 
Stingo,
 the grown man, and author of all Styron’s “real”  
fictions, has fulfilled his promise to Sophie to tell her story. But a
 generation after Thomas Pynchon erased Slothrop from Gravity's
 Rainbow, many critics like Pearl Bell found this multi-layered act of
 narrating to be as sprawling, prolix, and incohesive
 
as its  predecessors:
10
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There is too much in the novel about Stingo’s frustrated
 
efforts to unburden himself of his pent-up virginity.
 Except for the lyrical celebration of Prospect Park in high
 summer and a funny account of his failure 
to
 conquer an  
impregnable fortress named Leslie Lapidus, Stingo’s heavy
 preoccupations are prolix and faintly embarrassing.14 (p.
58)
On the other hand, Newsweek's reviewer called the book’s
 
arrangement of parts “a particularly
 
felicitous construction” (p. 89).15
Critical terminology that conveys precision is clearly still missing
 because we have no adequate ways of agreeing upon subjective
 responses based on
 the
 generalizations that refer everything to degrees of  
reliability, gradations of mental perceptions by characters in their own
 story-worlds, and derangements of “personhood”: “child,” “idiot,” “not-
 too-bright adult,” “innocent eye,” and their ilk.
Consider only what we lack with respect to the ideas about and
 
responsibilities of a category of narrating agencies we might call
“special,” or in some definable way, which are incidental to the main
 narrating 
tasks.
 I would cite here such examples as the Wedding Day  
segment of LDD (pp. 260-61) and the apocalyptic segment that we
 attribute to Cass Kinsolving immediately after his murder of Mason
 Flagg in STHF. All narrators know their stories, but special narrators
 frequently take control of the narrative voice without rending the fabric
 and destroying our notions
 
of verisimilitude and unity.
As a final example, Sophie’s point of view and hers alone must
 account for portions from Cracow, Warsaw, and Auschwitz. Stingo’s
 naivete precludes his being narrator until he has acquired the vision of
 unimaginable horror from Sophie herself (and gains the experience of
 his involvement with the other portion of the triangle
—
Nathan the  
brilliant, demented “monster” of 
the 
novel).
In Chapter 9, we meet this special narrator in the abrupt but
 courteous invocation to
 
play the game with the narrator as long as both  
sides
 
agree to the subterfuge:
As will be seen in due course (and the fact is important to
 
this narrative), Sophie told me a number of lies that
 summer. Perhaps I should say she indulged in certain
 evasions which at that time were necessary in order for her
 to retain her composure. Or maybe her sanity. I certainly
 don’t accuse her, for from the point of view of hindsight
 her truths seem fathomable beyond need of apology. Th
e passage awhile back about her early life in Cracow, for
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example—the soliloquy which I have tried to transcribe as
 
accurately as I have been able to remember it—is, I am now
 certain, made up mostly of the truth, (p. 97)
The idea of
 
the special narrator is a simple option of a narrator’s  
choice. “Random selection”
 is
 a traditional term for this kind of mental  
switchover, but it fails to
 
describe this case and the ends effected by  this  
narrative. None of this is 
new.
 Seymour Chatman, in his structuralist  
toxonomy of featural analyses of point of view in Story and Discourse
 (1978) has proposed 
his
 own coinage to refer to a covert narrator’s  
prerogative of jumping from mind to 
mind:
 “shifting limited mental  
access.” But the suasiveness of any rhetorical device should
 
always, he  
argues in a recent article, “confirm a text’s validity,” or, simply,
 “please.” Throughout “The ‘Rhetoric’ ‘of’ ‘Fiction,’” he claims that
 rhetoric cannot be taxonomically biased: “It is not concerned so much
 with the definitions of techniques like narrative voice or flashback but
 with showing how they
 
apply to the text’s ends—the set of explicit and  
implicit mental suasions to the implied reader” (p. 44).16
Similar to Booth’s complaint about Lawrence and his characters,
 
Chatman says that what matters most is promoting a sense of
 “fulfillment” in
 
the reader (p. 43). Not an easy task, of course, for
textual enjoyment and fulfillment are not simple
 
matters....Clearly the ancient rhetor’s solicitation of
 approval of the form of his speech quite apart from its
 content prefigures the novelist’s solicitation of the reader’s
 acceptance of the validity of the way [Chatman’s emphasis]
 the novel is put together, regardless of what the novel is
 about, (p. 43)
Bad esthetics equals bad choices. Such a bad choice, asserts
 
Chatman, was made by Lawrence in “Love Among the Haystacks”
 because the “well-spoken narrator” is extrinsic to the story-world of
 Midlands farmers. This is true, he 
says,
 of the Lawrence canon:
The verisimilitude of his fictions...founders to the extent
 
that the implied author shows himself unwilling or unable
 to strike a balance between the narrator’s voice and the
 voices of the characters, (p. 47)
And so we come full circle to our starting point, and the word
 
verisimilitude—once an archaism of subjective criticism and literary
 biography—is back in style. It is not clear what the two-decade hiatus
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between structuralism and deconstructionism’s waning will mean to
 
theoretical criticism. We see
 
a daily  escalation  of voices raised  against  
the followers of Paul de Man, the Yale professor and “archdeacon of
 deconstruction,” as David Lehman calls him in the second part of
 
his  
Signs of 
the
 Times (New York: Poseidon, 1991). But it  is beyond the  
scope of my critique of the later fiction of Styron. I must therefore
 conclude without solution to the problems of imprecision in our text
 anthologies by a
 
final quotation from Booth’s The Rhetoric of Fiction'.  
“In dealing with the types of narration, the critic must always limp
 behind, referring constantly to the varied practice which alone can
 correct his temptations
 
to overgeneralize” (p. 165).
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